Democratic Deviations and Constitutional Changes: The Case of Turkey by Picarella, Lucia
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of  
Interdisciplinary Studies 
                                   Vol 7 No 2 





© 2018 Lucia Picarella.















This article shows through a descriptive-qualitative methodology as the recent Turkish constitutional 
reform is fully inserted in the context of the strong debate on the transformations of contemporary 
democracies. In particular, the analysis emphasizes the underlying danger of this constitutional change, 
because the established super-presidentialism drives a strong drift away from the consolidation / 
institutionalization of democracy. Our conclusions show the risk of authoritarian involution from the total 
centralization of powers in the hands of the leader, which will have consequences both internally, an 
area in which there will be a stronger radicalization, and at the supranational level, because the heavy 
rerouting freezes the integrationist dreams.  
 





Traditionally, Turkey has emerged as a case of singular interest, because if on the one hand the 
policies of westernization have favored a strong approach to the European Union, prospecting the 
interesting possibility of integration of a single country of Muslim majority, on the other hand the role 
that historically had the Islamic religion in shaping the Turkish socio-political arena, and, many 
times, their consolidation in the political-institutional space, strongly focus the discussion on the 
secular question of the separation of religion and politics (Bardakoğlu, 2006; Messner, 2000).  
Undoubtedly, the drawing of the historical-constitutional frame of reference, supported by a 
qualitative-descriptive research methodology, underlines the singular contradiction of this territory, 
oscillating between secularism, democracy, nationalism, Islamic ideologies. 
So, a stranger mix from which the underlying antithesis derives from Turkish political action, 
namely, the ambition to become the democratic archetype for the Islamic world - setting up an 
institutional prototype perfectly capable of reconciling the different nuances that shape this political 
system - and, at the same time, the deviations from the initial dreams, which stop the strengthening 
of democracy. 
In this sense, the result of the April 2017 referendum, approving the constitutional change, 
that is, de facto, a super-presidentialism, determines a sudden involution that, inevitably, distances 




                                                            
1 This article is the result of a research project developed with the Aldo Moro Group of the International Masters 
in Political Science of the Catholic University of Colombia in agreement with the Università degli Studi di 
Salerno. 
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2. The Frame of Reference: A Panoramic 
 
Understanding the paradoxes and singularities that characterize Turkish territory cannot escape a 
quick consideration of its political and institutional history, a basic prerequisite for a critical 
evaluation of the democratic involution towards which Turkey is heading. In term of a properly 
political-administrative sphere, as well as a historical-geopolitical context, this system has been 
characterized by a great melting pot of races, religions and culture, which is significantly 
represented by the coexistence between two institutions, namely the ‘sandjak’ (administrative 
provinces) y las millet (Religious communities with their own jurisdiction) (Öktem, 1999: 1160; 
Tedeschi, 2006: 11).  
Under the inspiration of Renaissance and the French Revolution, the XIX  century begins with 
the great opening by the decadent empire to a stage of modernization, culminating in the 
‘Tanzimat’2, widely criticized by the Young Ottomans, supporters of an Islamic-liberal mold state, 
condensed in the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, a text that broadly expressed the contradiction 
mentioned at the beginning of this reflection between evolution and tradition. A text which, however, 
presents a significant intrinsic value, because if it cannot be recognized as the symbol of the 
beginning of the Turkish constitutional monarchy, it was undoubtedly fundamental for the 
determination of the following historical pages (Özbudun, 2005: 20), because properly through the 
following constitutional changes, was pushed more and more towards a democratic structure3.  
The events that characterized the European context in the late 1800s, in particular the 
upheavals in the Balkans and the Russo-Turkish war, effectively laid the foundations for the 
development of the clandestine movement of Young Turkish -focused on the need for renewal, and, 
mostly, to endow the political system with a modern constitution - and, indeed, properly their 
revolution, gave rise to the so-called Ottoman constitutional period (1908-1913), that is, a first 
experience of Parliamentary monarchy4, suddenly transformed into a military oligarchy due to the 
worsening of the international situation at the beginning of the XX century. The unconditional 
capitulation after the defeat of World War I, marks the beginning of the profound Turkish political 
change, led by Mustafa Kemal, which led to the independence and conformation of the Nation-
State (1919-1923). It seems appropriate to dwell on the events that characterized this phase, 
because the actions implemented represented, clearly, the basis of modern Turkish 
constitutionalism and, for the purposes of our analysis, a significant reading key. 
In this sense, the starting point is represented by the Congress of Erzurum (1919), a 
consequence of the circular sent by Kemal to the governors of all the Anatolian provinces, in which 
the architect of the transformation - preoccupied by the hypothesis of a peace agreement that 
ignored the rights of the Turkish people - underlined the importance of convening a National 
Assembly, also making explicit reference to the sovereignty of the people. 
In fact, the transition from theocracy to modernity crystallized in the meeting in Ankara of the 
                                                            
2 The Tanzimat proclaimed relevant reforms in matters of equality, regardless of religion or race, in matters of 
taxation, justice, education (Dumont, 1989: 459).  
3 In fact, this text was inspired by the Constitution of Belgium of 1831 and the Prussian Constitution of 1850, and 
presented all the characteristics of a constitutional text, specifying the sultanate as a form of state, Islam as 
state religion and Turkish as a language official. In addition, the text presented a list of citizens' rights, such as 
the right to education, security and private property, freedom of religion and the press, prohibition of torture and 
slavery. Also relevant was the creation of a legislative assembly partially elected by the people and formed by 
two chambers, through which was guaranteed the exercise of power. In spite of these developments, however, 
the Empire was still quite far from a true democratic constitution, because the Sultan continued to lead all 
decision-making dynamics, and, in addition, the absence of a true separation of powers and the creation of 
respective controls institutions did not allow the protection and application of the rights and freedoms listed 
(Özcan, 2012; Gözler, 2008).  
4 This stage was characterized by the reestablishment of the Constitution of 1876, suspended after the Turkish 
defeat in 1878, and by important constitutional changes (precisely, between 1909 and 1918, there were six 
constitutional changes) that favored the introduction of important rights, such as the right to assembly and strike, 
the freedom of the press (Vaner, 1988: 87).   
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Great National Assembly (April 1920), a sui generis constituent organism that approved the 
enactment of the Kemalist Basic Law (1921), a provisional Constitution agreement that establishing 
organizational principles foreseeing the implementation of a new government5. 
From this moment, starts a period of diarchy, that is to say, a coexistence between the 
nationalist government created by the Great National Assembly and the Sultanate, definitively 
abolished on the vigil of the Lausanne Peace Conference, whose treaty was ratified by the Second 
Grand National Assembly, which finally proclaimed the Republic of Turkey promulgating the new 
Constitutional Text (April 1924). The following constitutional amendments undoubtedly seemed to 
confirm the will to shape the state in conformity with western ideals, and in this sense, in application 
of Kemalist purposes, the constitutional reform of 1937 will constitutionalize the guidelines of the 
policy of the Turkish state (Article 2)6. However, this is a text in which there are weaknesses, 
because the concentration of executive and legislative powers in the General Assembly, and the 
absence of control mechanisms to guarantee the application of the law and its constitutionality in 
matters of individual and collective rights, if theoretically betting on the materialization of a 
Rousseauian-style democracy, he expressed with the change of the party system all the risks of the 
involution of the majority democracy (Haykemez, 2003;  Örmeci, 2012; Özbudun 2005: 21-22).  
In fact, the beginning of the multi-party phase (1946) represents a significant line of 
demarcation both at the political and institutional levels. 
The conquest of the majority by the Democratic Party (DP), a center-right party supported by 
Islamist movements that ended the republican (CHP) one-party period, drive to a new era 
characterized by a softening of secularism, condemnation of Islamic extremism and openness to 
capitalist policies. 
In fact, the formation of a multi-party arena, required at the institutional level, the need to 
guarantee all the different expressions, a necessity which the Constitution - because of its faults - 
clearly failed to protect, and therefore converged in the malaise expressed by intellectuals and 
students and that had as result the coup d'état of 1960 (Landau, 1974). With the aim of molding a 
new and more effective democratic system, based on a parliamentary and multi-party structure, 
was adopted a new Constitution (1961), considered as a great example of democracy. Obviously, 
founded this text the European Charter of Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Aybay, 1977: 22; Isiksel, 2013), and it was legitimized by the modality of approval, namely, 
the vote of all those entitled (Özcan, 2012: 63-66; Tanör, 2007), in addition to the proclamation of 
Turkey as a Republic based on human rights (Article 2) and an extensive list of rights inspired by 
the principles of plurality (Özbudun, 2005: 23; Özcan, 2012: 66). However, again, in a short time the 
landscape was destined to change. The decade of the 70s was characterized by violence, 
terrorism, by strengthening the power of the military, because the National Security Council, an 
independent judicial organism, often began to centralize the power. 
Correspondingly, at the political level, there is a strengthening of political Islamism, 
represented by Erbakan's National Order Party (NOP), re-founded in the National Salvation Party 
(NSP) and which gained power in a coalition with the Republicans in 1973. 
                                                            
5 In fact, it is a provisional text, which cannot be read as a republican constitution, because does not have 
republican rights or provisions. It is important to point out, in the perspective of this reflection, again the contrast 
between conservative positions, expressed in the principle according to legislative decisions must conform to 
Sharia, and modernization, because the foresight of the new government was based on the principle that the 
sovereignty resides in the nation. 
6 Quickly, according to this constitutional change, the state government must be inspired by the republican 
principle, nationalism, the populist principle - aimed at underscoring the national sovereignty as the foundation 
of the Republic -, statehood - through which make easy the return to the state of the economic and commercial 
activities concentrated in foreign hands-, the evolutionary principle - which, despite terminological issues, 
showed the fidelity to the Ataturk revolution and the obligation to perfect it by means of legal tools for the 
purpose of avoiding subversion - , and, finally, secularism. A principle which causes a few difficulties and which 
again verified the contradictions of the adoption, at formal level, of a properly Western principle in an Islamic 
Country, in clear contrast with what practice showed, namely, the validity of Alcoranics formulas. Particularly in 
reference to the difficulties of terminology related to these principles, see Melis (2012). 
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From this moment, through the equalization between the Islamic schools (imam-hatip) and the 
state schools, the political scene was occupied by the powerful Islamism lobby group, to which 
Erdogan belong. Also, in consideration of the institutional sphere, the Constitution was totally 
emptied of its democratic meaning, with the modification of art. 11 which, by overturning the initial 
forecasts, established the contraction of fundamental freedoms and rights for the purposes of 
protecting national integrity. 
In this context, which also included economic problems and undoubtedly the absence of an 
internalization of democratic culture, explode a new coup in 1980, which predictably adopted by a 
new Constitution (1982), that was defined as an "anti-constitution" for the violations of the human 
rights present in it (Isiksel, 2013: 720); a text that, until the April 2017 referendum, has guided the 
Turkish state.  
Also, the priority of this text seems to be the concentration of power, particularly in the hands 
of the executive under the control of the National Security Council. And, for this purpose, the action 
of restyling perpetrated was impressive, because, for example, in art. 2 the word founded was 
replaced by respect for human rights (Özcan, 2012: 66-68), likewise the art. 13 properly titled 
"restrictions of rights and freedoms" in cases of threats to national sovereignty, integrity of the state, 
public order and morality, and, on this route, it moved the creation of institutions to control the 
university autonomy, the press, the freedom of association (Biagini, 2002: 148).  
Too, the political climate was very complicated, because if the Islamist parties were officially 
disqualified, the government itself favored Islamism, in particular the diffusion of Islamic education, 
to confront religious extremism and communism (Narli, 1996; Karmon, 1997), until achieved in the 
election of 1996 the conquest of the Presidency of the Republic by the WP (Welfare Party) of 
Erbakan, convinced to transform Islam into the tool capable of facing both capitalism and 
communism7.  
The end of the 1990s, then, will present a paradoxical situation, oscillating between the 
resurrection / radicalization of political Islam and the impulses towards necessary constitutional 
changes, prerequisites for a membership to the EU. 
 
3. The Democratic Contraction: From Parliamentarism to Hyper-Presidentialism 
 
Undoubtedly, a new paragraph in the Turkish political-constitutional history opens with the official 
candidacy to join the European Union (1999), a time when starts more substantial efforts at 
constitutional reforms for to comply with the Copenhagen criteria8.  
However, in spite of a greater openness in the delicate area of fundamental rights, which 
clearly represents the terrain of confrontation with the EU, the efforts failed to solve the problems of 
democratize and, then, failed to overcome the obstacles that stopped the integrationist dreams. In 
fact, the elimination of state monopoly over the media, the possibility for public employees to be 
members of political parties and associations - although it remained impossible for them to strike – 
and the strengthening of the Constitutional Court, represented a few steps, on which floated the 
weight of the absence of a true separation of powers, of parliamentary immunity, of the strong 
powers of political leaders, of the death penalty, abolished only in 2004. 
So, as earlier mentioned, the attempts to rise to a true "western" democracy, clashed with the 
                                                            
7 The WP was born in 1983, after the disqualification of the NSP, and its electoral base was formed mainly by 
rural migrants and religious conservatives, and, geographically, the fort was represented by the cities of the 
interior. In spite of his secular education, Erbakan joined the religious movements, and developed his ideology 
founded, first, on the strong criticism of Turkish politics, accused of supporting imperialism and Zionism while, 
owners of the largest American banks, conspired against the whole world. From there, in the second place, it 
develops the vision of Islam as a mechanism to create a just order, whose values were not opposed to 
modernity. In this sense, for example, MUSIAD was founded, an independent association of industrialists and 
entrepreneurs, which represented the core of the Islamic economic system (Shankland, 1999; Vaner, 2000; 
Noyon, 2004).   
8For these criteria: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm. 
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contradictions that continued to characterize the Turkish political system, mostly identified in a 
significant exacerbation of political Islamism, which seemed to end in 1997, with Erbakan's 
ineligibility and the consequent disappearance of the WP, accused of violating the principle of state 
secularism9. The global scene that emerged after 9/11, and the consequent chess games that were 
set in motion to fight the global threat, namely, Islamic terrorism, evidently placed Turkey in the eye 
of the storm. The image of compatibility between moderate Islamism and a secular and democratic 
republic was faced with the internal growth of anti-American / anti-Western positions and the risk of 
more radical Islamist forces, a danger that seemed to materialize with the attacks of 2003 in 
Istanbul, claimed by Al Qaeda (Erginsoy, 2001). It was precisely in this complicated context that 
fine-tuned the strategies for the detonation of a new leadership, Tayyip Erdogan, that from the 
outset showed his willingness to lead and transcend Turkish political change and modernization. 
Away from the conservative currents, faithful to the erbakanianas positions, and rehabilitated to the 
political life, founded in 2001 its party, AKP (Party of Justice and Development), that appeared like 
moderate, secular, pro-European. The majority in the 2002 elections, conquered through the 
capacity to gain support from both the secular and religious sectors, was the basis on which to 
support Erdogan's ambitious program, which, on the internal level, declared his favor of necessity 
to separate religion and politics, to promote a multi-party system and to respect human rights, to 
stabilize the economy. 
On the foreign policy, Erdogan to approach to Western positions, declaring his unconditional 
support for the war on terrorism, his willingness to join the EU, the consolidation of political and 
economic relations with the Arab world (Rubin, 2005). An agenda that clearly had to start with the 
constitutional change, one of the cardinal goals of the AKP and its leader, and which aroused from 
the outset doubts about the possibility to implement a change really in accordance with democratic 
parameters. In fact, the paradoxes underlying this political system soon became apparent, so much 
so that the Constitutional Court raised the constitutionality of proposals presented by the AKP10, 
and, too, the rapprochement with Islamist positions, confirmed the perplexities of the EU, which 
rejected the integration, a decision that obstructed relations between the Union and Turkey11.   
The evolution of recent years confirms the drift that has taken place, corroborating the position 
of those who saw in a new constitutional change the risk of establishing an authoritarian system 
based on a single party. In this sense, we can see the constant deterioration of the role of the 
military, historically depositaries of secularism and the protection of democracy, and, of course, the 
measures that came after the attempt coup of July 2016, justified by the insurgent military as a 
necessary action for the restoration of a democratic order. A project that failed in convulsive hours, 
enough to trigger bloody confrontations between counterparts, as well as Erdogan's cruel reaction - 
which invited the Country to resist the coup, taking to the streets -, and finally the concern of the 
whole world, with the eyes of Russia and United States focused on the possible consequences of 
these events. Consequently, and despite the proclamations of world leaders to respect the 
democratic order, the intransigent counterattack of the President was not long in coming and, in a 
State in total chaos, began the bloodbath.  
Events that, as mentioned, will undoubtedly affect Turkey's international relations, projecting 
new possible global scenarios. Quickly regaining power and reestablishing his control, Erdogan 
declared as an enemy of Turkey any country that provide protection to the radical Islamist 
                                                            
9 It should be noted, for example, the radicalization of Erbakan's position when, in a provocative way, affirmed 
the need to fight corruption with the restoration of Sharia; as well as its opposition to the strengthening of tools 
for the protection of women from domestic violence (Ustun, 1998; Narli, 1999).   
10 In fact, the separation between religion and politics was not achieved, and very strong were the debates 
concerning the prohibition or less of the veil, as well as with reference to the definition of adultery as a criminal 
offense, and the reform in 2012 of the instruction, that continues to strengthen the Koranic institutes. 
11 Negotiations began in December 2004 and were clearly fueled by strong debates that highlighting non-
compliance with Copenhagen parameters, as well as the importance of solving problems in relations with 
Greece and, mostly, a lifestyle and a different culture of European identity. Positions supported by the majority 
of the European population which disillusioned the Turkish population, strengthened anti-European sentiments 
by claiming the Islamic character of their country. To deepen: Pan (2005).  
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ideologue Fetullah Gulen, in exile in the USA who, in turn, maintained its position of rejecting the 
Turkish request for extradition12. The hardening of the tone of the Turkish leader seemed then a 
clear warning to the American government, because, assuming that the Turkish armed forces are 
the second largest permanent forces in NATO and, together with Israel, the strongest power in the 
Near East, the Turkish government suspended its international commitments of military 
reciprocity13.  
The flow of the consequent implications was quickly formed in the minds of international 
relations experts, because the distension in the diplomatic-energy relations with Moscow if on the 
one hand stop the Western strategies of containment of Russia, with the consequent reflections on 
energy supply to Europe, on the other hand this improvement did not necessarily imply a limitation 
of Turkish imperialist policies in the Middle East - territory that containing the US breathing – and, 
mostly, to end their ambiguous relations with fundamentalist groups fighting against Damascus.  
In addition, the growing consideration of restoring the death penalty - now not only as a 
measure to punish the insurgents - would mean completely cutting off ties with Europe and, also, 
with NATO, because both are based on respect for Democratic principles. Undoubtedly, front of the 
crossing of strengthening democratic consolidation as an antidote to deviations and, conversely, 
taking advantage of the situation to centralize all power in their hands, the Turkish leader has 
definitely chosen the latter option, deeply deteriorating – in a political level - the precarious balance 
between powers. Well, what emerged in the post-coup has been an immediate turn towards the 
worst populist face, as likewise toward the strengthening of Islamic radicalization and the 
dismantling of the secular / moderate structure, an action confirmed by violent cleansing in all 
political, administrative, judicial, academic and military units. The declaration of the state of 
emergency, and its governance, has very simply fueled and accelerated the authoritarian drift, 
precipitating in the final test, namely the approval of the constitutional reform, necessarily submitted 
to a referendum due to the lack of achievement of the quorum necessary to avoid a popular 
consultation14.  
As predictable, the election campaign has been polarized between Erdogan's position, which 
aimed at strengthening the nationalist electorate, has called for a vote for "a Homeland," while the 
oppositions called for a no “for freedom and democracy”. Moreover, this campaign was 
characterized by episodes of intimidation, artifices and illegalities, summarized in the removal of 
OSCE international observers, in the pre-eminent presence of Erdogan in the media and in the 
meeting on both sides of the Bosporus, in acts of violence against activists and in the arrests of 
members of the pro-Kurdish party (HDP), in the reduction and limitation of political freedoms - such 
as the elimination of sanctions for violations of par condicio – in the name of the state of 
emergency. A violations of democratic standards repeatedly evidenced by international experts - 
who have demonstrated the lack of impartiality and freedom in voting operations, also challenging 
the regularity of the consultation, due to the use of a large number of ballots without official seal -, 
and which have led to the cancellation of the Turkish Ministers' meetings in some European 
countries15. Together with this reflection, it is interesting an examination of the vote16 and its 
                                                            
12 Erdogan accused Gulen of having organized the coup, despite his condemnation of this event. The preacher, 
former ally of the Turkish leader long since converted into a strong enemy, has been in voluntary exile in the 
United States since 1999, where - according to the news circulated after the accusations brought by Erdogan - 
he was the administrator of an economic empire. Some rumors that fomented the hypotheses of an international 
conspiracy, clearly feed by the Erdogan.  
13 Specifically, it looked like an action directed properly at the US government, due to the decision to establish a 
no-fly zone in Turkish airspace and cut off the electricity from the Incirlik airbase - whose general was detained 
because he was accused of participating in the coup – they were guarded fighting aircraft of the USA and of the 
other members of the international anti-SIIL coalition.  
14 In particular, Erdogan conquered 339 favorable deputies over 550, remaining below the 367 votes necessary 
to approve the reform through institutional channels.   
15 Mostly, in France, Germany, Holland; an action that has triggered the resentment of the Turkish leader who 
has strongly criticized the "crusade" of foreign nations, also threatening a revision of the agreements on 
migrants and the restoration of the death penalty. 
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geographic distribution, since, compared to expectations, Erdogan managed to overcome his 
opponents by a difference of only 2.6 percentage points (51.3% vs. 48.7%). 
A result that has to be combined with the significant loss of electoral support of the AKP-MHP 
bloc (-10.7 percentage points) compared to the 2015 elections, as well as the fracture between 
urban provinces (where wins the “not” to the reform) and rural contexts (where wins the “yes” to the 
reform) and, likewise, the withdrawal of the more educated AKP electorate, which supports the “not” 
to the reform. 
The reading of this result, then, must be verged first at the internal-partisan level, because the 
absence of the expected popular consecration may favor a split in AKP, with the leader who could 
quickly get back in the head of this party, without waiting for the official publication of the 
constitutional reform and, likewise, advancing the general and presidential elections (formally set 
for November 3, 2019). Second, in consideration of the external level, the EU has reiterated the 
concern of a reform that gives to Erdogan unbridled powers, evidencing that the implementation of 
this constitutional package that would extend the presidency until 2034 and which eliminates any 
form of check and balance, will move to the suspension of negotiations for the Turkish membership 
to the EU. 
Thus, although it has been a “contained” electoral victory, is setting up the change of the face 
of Turkey in an autocracy far from the ideals of Ataturk. Of course, the super-presidentialism that 
has been established with this reform, give to Erdogan an uncontainable power, because it realized 
a concentration in his person of all the political power, that is to say the leadership in his party, and 
institutional, namely to centralization in their hands of the three powers without any parliamentary 
control, due to the total disempowerment of the Assembly17.  
A condensation of lifetime, which, of course, is ramified in all sectors, as demonstrated by the 
operation of silencing - prolonged after the coup - of opposition and media power.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Undoubtedly, wake a great apprehension the erosion of the rule of law and the involution of the 
democratic process that start up in Turkey with the approval of the constitutional reform and with 
the consequent change in the Presidential Republic. 
If, historically, it has been a country characterized by the constant tension between unfulfilled 
promises and ambitions, by the mixture between ethnic and religious matrix, by the ideals of 
secularism and democracy, however, now it is presented in the world context a profoundly different 
Turkey. Well, a change that, in the immediate future, will give us consequences both in terms of 
integration, evidencing the failure of integrationist impulses and dreams that, today, crash against 
the fortification of nationalist schemes. So too, in terms of extremism and radicalization, because 
the implications of this transformation will spill over all ethnic-religious minorities and opponents of 
the new order. 
The drift towards which Turkish democracy is headed, is also condensed in the submission of 
the rules of the democratic game to the "one-man rule", and, necessarily, the corollaries coming 
                                                                                                                                                                  
16 The percentages of official votes have been consulted in European Union website, http://europa.eu/ 
17  More specifically, the constitutional reform provides for the abolition of the government and the Prime 
Minister, because the executive power is submitted to the President of the Republic, elected every five years in 
conjunction with the political elections, which therefore acquires all powers of the prime minister, together with 
the power to appoint and revoke the ministers and to sign executive decrees. In fact, along with the elimination 
of the balance of power - typically based on a parliamentary system on the motion of confidence-, this reform 
also eliminates the principle of impartiality, i.e. the possibility of the President of the Republic being a member / 
leader of a political party: in this case, what is abolished is the obligation for the President to resign from any 
position once elected. In addition, the reform introduces new provisions with reference to the composition of the 
Judicial Council and Public Ministries, among the most important organs of the Turkish Republic, because the 
number of members falls from 22 to 13, of which 6 shall be appointed by the President and 7 by the Parliament. 
The debates that preceded the approval of this reform were very broad, to deepen: Isiksel (2013: 724); Koker 
(2013); Mahçupyan – Uçum - Genç (2013).  
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from this election will soon arrive: the future of democracy is hanging in a thread, and in Turkey the 
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